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1 Introduction 
The security landscape in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been marked by the dominance 
of NATO as the sole credible structure for military security. This situation is now undergoing a 
transformation. (Whitman, 2004, p. 430) 
 
This paper was written in the midst of Russian aggression towards Ukraine, after 
the Russian annexation of Crimea. Meanwhile, the EU actions taken and not taken 
in relation to the conflict have been debated in newspapers across Europe. EU 
member states cooperating on matters of security and defence within the European 
Union has been and remains a sensitive topic, for various reasons for different 
governments.  
However, despite the sensitive nature of national security, the degree of EU 
cooperation on matters of security and defence has grown over the last two decades. 
The increase in degree of cooperation has also occurred despite the lack of a 
common military threat. So why have the EU member states chosen to intensify 
their cooperation on these sensitive matters?  
This paper will analyse the expansion of EU cooperation on security and 
defence since the early 1990’s. The puzzle in this expansion of security and defence 
cooperation is why do states cooperate on matters of security and defence when 
they lack a common military threat?  
To answer the question I follow the approach laid out by Maria Strömvik in her 
dissertation To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s collective 
foreign policy, and apply it to the distinctly different but understudied policy area 
that is the CSDP. I am following Strömvik’s approach because of the explanatory 
value she shows it has for the development of the CFSP, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. The Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, has been 
developed as a more specific policy arena within the CFSP. The area of policy is 
similar where the CFSP handles EU foreign policy, including matters of security. 
The CSDP is more specialized compared to the CFSP and solely handles matters of 
security and defence rather than more general foreign policy.  
1.1 The Puzzle  
There exists several theories on how states cooperate on matters of security and 
defence when they perceive they are faced with a common enemy (see Strömvik, 
2005, p. 8). The theories illustrate how states as actors cooperate when faced with 
a common enemy; usually by forming an alliance (e.g. NATO, the Warzaw Pact). 
But why do states cooperate on matters of security and defence when the perception 
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of a shared military threat does not exist? The European cooperation on matters of 
defence and security has increased, especially since the beginning of the 1990s.  
Strömvik points out (2005, p. 4) that it is a relatively easy task to identify why 
EU member states fail to act as one so often. With oft diverging interest, and in the 
case of CSDP, a veto right for all 271 participants for any decision made within that 
institution, it is not unsurprising that decisions are difficult to reach. What is more 
difficult, and an intriguing puzzle, is to explain why they sometimes do succeed 
(and increasingly so) to act collectively, especially regarding such sensitive 
questions as defence and security.  
There is a gap in the research on state cooperation on security and defence, 
therefore the research question guiding this paper is: 
 
Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they 
do not perceive a shared military threat?  
1.2 The case 
EU member states have put significant resources into various attempts of a common 
European defence. The most recent result of those efforts is the Common Security 
and Defence Policy, CSDP (which prior to 2009 was known as the European 
Security and Defence Policy, ESDP). The predecessor to the CSDP, the ESDP, was 
created in 2003 out of the framework of the Western European Union, WEU. These 
three security and defence institutions are analysed in this paper as indicators of EU 
security and defence cooperation.  
1.3 The hypothesis 
The foundation of the hypothesis is that states are influence maximisers. When 
states choose to cooperate on matters of security and defence they do it to gain 
influence, but at the same time the states as separate actors lose autonomy. States 
choose to cooperate in order to gain influence in relation to the strongest actor in 
the international system. In this paper the strongest actor in the international system 
is considered to be the United States.  
Since the case of this paper is the EU security and defence cooperation and the 
strongest actor in the international system is the US, the transatlantic relations are 
key to understanding the development of the institutionalized forms of EU security 
and defence cooperation. The hypothesis is that the political will of the EU member 
states to cooperate on matters of security and defence increases when they 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Denmark, the 28th EU member, has opted out of the Common Security and Defence Policy. See Bailes et al for 
an entire chapter on Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy (2006, chapter 1).  
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collectively disagree with a US foreign policy. In other words, when the US 
performs a foreign policy (e.g. the invasion of Iraq) which all or some EU member 
states disagrees with, the political will among the EU member states to cooperate 
further increases. Note that the political will to cooperate increases, EU 
disagreement with US foreign policy does not directly translate into a deepened 
cooperation. The hypothesis is that any institutionalization of cooperation is done 
in order to gain influence in relation to the strongest actor in the international 
system. Maria Strömvik tested her more sophisticated version of this hypothesis on 
the adjacent policy arena, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This paper 
thus tests the validity of a hypothesis that holds for an adjacent field of policy.  
1.4 So what? 
The theoretical literature on international security institutions is relatively sparse 
and leaves scholars wanting (see e.g. Menon, 2011, p. 85 and Berenskoetter, 2013 
for a discussion on this). This opens up the field of research for contributions to the 
understanding of cooperation on matters of security to be made. My contribution, 
then, is a systematic study of a policy field which has been understudied 
theoretically (Menon, 2011, p. 85; Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 381 ff.).  
The theory presented by Strömvik in her dissertation has so far been overlooked 
by researchers. Therefore the field of research benefits from the systematic study 
of it done in this paper.  
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2 Theory 
The previous section introduced the paper and the purpose of writing it. This section 
explains the theory underpinning the hypothesis. The hypothesis has been briefly 
stated above and is below elaborated on. Following the elaboration of the 
hypothesis, the theory underpinning the hypothesis is explained and discussed with 
fundamental assumptions made explicit.  
With the differences of the two institutional constructs CFSP and CSDP in 
mind, I have attempted to stay as close as possible to Strömvik’s assumptions in 
order to test her thesis more fairly. That said, Strömvik’s dissertation is a much 
more in-depth work of research and this paper will not be at par with it.  
2.1 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis in this paper is, as has been noted above, derived from Maria 
Strömvik’s dissertation To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s 
collective foreign policy (2005). In her dissertation Strömvik analyses the 
evolvement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the CFSP. This 
paper instead analyses the Common Security and Defence Policy, the CSDP. The 
CSDP is a part of the CFSP framework. However, this does not mean that the CSDP 
and the CFSP have necessarily been created and evolved for the same reasons. In 
other words, explaining the development of the CFSP does not automatically 
explain the development of the CSDP.  
In brevity, the hypothesis is that the EU member states are balancing influence 
relative to the strongest actor in the international system, which has been and 
remains to be the United States. The EU member states are attempting to balance 
US influence by cooperating. Cooperating does, however, infer autonomy losses 
for each member state in the field of cooperation. They manage to cooperate due to 
a perceived greater benefit than loss, in other words greater influence for the group 
as an actor is traded in for less autonomy for the states as actors. The key to the 
hypothesis is that cooperation is expected to intensify due to periods of common 
disagreement with US foreign policy, for this is when the political will of the EU 
member states increases.  
The hypothesis is explained in more detail in the section directly below. 
2.1.1 Balance-of-influence-hypothesis  
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Elaborating on the explanation above, Strömvik’s dissertation has the collective 
security and foreign policy of the EU (European Political Cooperation, EPC and 
CFSP) as the focal point of her research. Applying Strömvik’s hypothesis to the 
CSDP and its predecessors will not only be another test of her balance-of-influence 
hypothesis, but will help discern why states may choose to cooperate in matters 
regarding defence and security. The differences between the CFSP and the CSDP 
are not monumental, rather the CSDP can be thought of as a branch of the CFSP 
specialized to deal with matters of common EU defence and security issues. The 
relative closeness of the two constructs CFSP and CSDP means the analysis 
borrowed from Strömvik’s dissertation is relevant for this paper. What will be 
analysed more specifically are institutional changes to the cooperation, i.e. what is 
analysed are formal changes that are institutionalised.  
Moving on to the hypothesis, Strömvik’s theory is that the level of cooperation 
between EU member states is a trade-off. An increased level of cooperation in 
foreign and security policy brings about an autonomy loss since it restrains the 
member states in various forms (i.e. a common EU position may undermine a 
specific member state’s intended position). At the same time as it is a cost, in the 
form of an autonomy loss, it is a benefit in that the common voice of the EU member 
states may have more of an impact than that of a single state. Do note that this 
hypothesis does not attempt to portray the US as a threat to which the EU member 
states are responding. Rather, the EU member states try to maximise their influence 
in international affairs by cooperating. Cooperation, then, is facilitated by US 
foreign policy that EU member states disagree with. Strömvik expands on this: 
 
It is not primarily A’s ability to influence B that should be seen to constitute the 
balancing behaviour, but rather A’s ability to influence events that B also wants to 
influence. Consequently, cooperation as a balancing strategy should be interpreted 
as an attempt to increase – in relation to the most influential actor – the collective 
ability to influence events and outcomes. (Strömvik, 2005, p. 49) 
 
The hypothesis yields that cooperation will only happen if the perceived gains 
in influence are greater than the autonomy loss (Strömvik, 2005, p. 142 f). This is 
expected to lead to increased levels of cooperation during periods of disagreement 
with the most influential actor in the system. In other words, states lacking a 
perceived common threat or enemy are likely to cooperate in matters of security 
and defence when collectively disagreeing with the most influential actor in the 
system. This cooperation, then, is strengthening the position of the states and thus 
balances the influence of the cooperating states in relation to the most influential 
actor. It is fundamental to realize that this hypothesis does not give a strict causal 
relationship in the form of: ‘when there is disagreement, cooperation intensifies’. 
Rather, cooperation as a strategy for the EU member states becomes more of a 
viable option to increase their influence. 
When EU member states disagree with a US foreign policy it is essential to not 
focus on finding increased institutional cooperation undertaken in order to tackle 
that specific “hot issue” over which the US and the EU disagree. Rather, the “hot 
  6 
topic”, e.g. the invasion of Iraq, acts as a catalyst for increased cooperation to tackle 
future policies (Strömvik, 2005, p. 180).  
The hypothesis builds on three fundamental assumptions (see Strömvik, 2005, 
pp. 145 f.). These key assumptions are; 
1. States are influence-maximisers.  
2. Decisions on cooperation are based on an analysis where autonomy loss is 
weighed against influence gains. 
3. Cooperation on matters of security and defence is seen by states as one 
possible strategy for balancing (the influence-balancing behaviour is taken 
in relation to the most influential actor in the system, rather than the most 
threatening).   
The three fundamental assumptions above are the most crucial ones for the 
hypothesis. They do, however build upon an additional set of three assumptions 
common to several theories regarding state cooperation.  
First, states can be analysed “as if they are capable of making at least fairly 
conscious choices, and that the strategies chosen can, within limits, be seen as the 
result of rational calculations by their leaders” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 36). In other 
words, an assumption of a degree of rationality is assumed, Strömvik calls this “soft 
rationality” (ibid).  
Second, “states are able to formulate preferences regarding preferred outcomes 
as well as regarding their preferred means of achieving these outcomes” (Strömvik, 
2005, p. 37) 
Third, states are “assumed to condition their behaviour on the expected 
behaviour of others” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 37).  
The hypothesis paints a picture where disagreement fuels political will to 
cooperate. This raises the question if the opposite would hold true as well. If foreign 
policy of the most influential actor is in line with the preferences of the EU 
members, would the EU security cooperation decline over time as a result? 
Strömvik discusses this and concludes that the “perceived need to cooperate should 
be at a stand-still or perhaps even decrease” (2005, p. 143). However, Strömvik also 
points to the institutional development and writes that there seems to be a lock in 
effect of CFSP cooperation, that the increased levels of cooperation seem to be a 
flight of stairs rather than an oscillating curve, illustrating that new levels of 
cooperation become institutionalized (Strömvik, 2005, p. 180).  
As part of the institutionalization of cooperation new aides to facilitate 
cooperation may be created so that the cooperation yields less friction. The 
cooperation becomes lubricated by a change in attitudes and removal of institutional 
hurdles, or by adding institutional aides (such as secretariats) (Strömvik, 2005, p. 
181). Strömvik points out that institutional changes, such as creating a new agency 
to assist a policy area, may be important lubricants but that this is an under 
researched area (2005, p. 181). These ‘institutional lubricants’ are present 
throughout the evolvement of the EU cooperation on security and defence. 
Therefore, they are mentioned when relevant in the data section. One example of 
such an institutional aide created to improve the cooperation is the European 
Defence Agency, EDA.  
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3 Method 
The previous section explained the hypothesis and the theory underpinning it. This 
section of the paper will explain the choices made on how to answer the research 
question. The research question guiding this paper is:  
 
Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they do 
not perceive a common military threat? 
3.1 Research design 
In her dissertation (2005) Strömvik shows that EU member states increase foreign 
policy cooperation to balance US influence when disagreeing with US foreign 
policy. Strömvik tests this theory against empirical data in competition with other 
theories and finds that the theory holds and should be studied further. This paper 
utilizes Strömvik’s theory and applies it to the policy area of security and defence 
cooperation among the EU member states in order to answer the research question.  
The following section explains the research design. The research design in this 
paper is thus based on Maria Strömvik’s research design presented in her 
dissertation To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s collective 
foreign policy. Accordingly, this paper will be an observational study where the 
independent and dependent variables are observed. The variables will be observed 
over time in order to allow for causal claims—i.e. the hypothesis presented in this 
paper—to be tested and the research question to be answered. An important 
difference between the research design of this study and that of Strömvik is the time 
period. Strömvik’s analysis stretches from 1970 to 1999, and this study stretches 
from 1991 through 2014.  
Periods of change to the European cooperation on security and defence are 
accordingly identified. Examples of such notable changes to the cooperation 
include; the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force in 1999) which 
laid much of the groundwork for a common European defence policy, as well as the 
Berlin Plus agreement which institutionalized important parts of the security and 
defence relationship between EU and NATO, such as intelligence sharing and 
interoperable forces. Periods of change to European security and defence 
cooperation, such as these two indicate, will be identified and situated in global 
events, with a strong focus on the transatlantic relationship. By identifying periods 
of change to the security cooperation it becomes possible to situate them in a 
transatlantic context and discern whether or not the hypothesis holds. This is done 
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in the analysis section. Prior to the analysis section the indicators and the history of 
the transatlantic relations are presented in separate sections. 
This paper will not cover the entire contemporary history of EU security and 
thus a selection has been made. Strömvik tackles this by choosing a timeframe—
1970-1999—in which to analyse the development of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, CFSP. This paper will not analyse the same time period Strömvik 
analyses, as is mentioned above, simply because the more recent years—i.e. post-
Cold War—are of more relevance to the development of the European defence and 
security cooperation.  
I operationalize European security and defence cooperation as the 
WEU/ESDP/CSDP; more on this choice follows below. To capture the key changes 
to these constructs I thus analyse the timeframe 1991 through 2014. The study is 
thus focused on relatively recent developments. Important events that could be 
considered relevant may therefore be lacking. The reason for choosing this time 
period is that studying this period ensures that major institutional changes to the 
security cooperation are captured more in-depth. Furthermore, since 1991 the 
security and defence cooperation2 has indeed intensified, thus ensuring there has 
been an observable change in the dependent variable.  
The identified periods of institutional change between 1991 and 2014 will help 
situate the cooperation—where the degree of cooperation will be compared to that 
of previous and subsequent periods. The degree of cooperation will thus be 
measured in relation to itself. This alleviates the problem of finding an accurate 
measurement of the degree of cooperation by instead comparing more in-depth 
descriptions of the cooperation with each other. A potential problem is, however, 
that the cooperation changes but whether or not the degree of cooperation has 
increased is difficult to interpret. To clarify my point, institutional change does not 
necessarily mean that the degree of cooperation has increased or decreased, but 
merely that it has changed. This issue will be dealt with by comparing analysts’ 
reports on European security and defence cooperation. Establishing if there is more 
or less cooperation relative another period in time will be necessary in order to vary 
it against EU disagreement with US policy.  
When the periods of change have been identified the thesis is tested against the 
gathered data. The EU member states and the US are the relevant actors for this 
study, but an EU member state disagreeing unilaterally with the US outside of the 
EU framework is not necessarily relevant. However, if such a member state was 
placed in a context where the disagreement rallies the other EU member states to a 
common standpoint against the US, it would be relevant. This illustrates that each 
identified discrepancy between the US and the EU on foreign policy must be 
analysed carefully. An example of serious disagreement between the EU member 
states and the US over US foreign policy is the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Throughout the paper the security cooperation will be labelled as just that; cooperation. In other policy areas 
the relevant term is rather integration. The distinction between security cooperation and security integration is 
important since, again as compared to other EU policy areas, the institutionalization of the cooperation is 
intergovernmental, not supranational. For the interested reader, see the work of Seth G. Jones (2007) who 
discusses this distinction at more length.  
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A key point in Strömvik’s thesis is that disagreement between the EU member 
states as a group and the US over US foreign policy encourages further EU security 
cooperation. However, this does not mean that all of the member states necessarily 
disagree with the US policy (despite the necessity for consensus on every question 
handled within the CSDP). Rather, if the member states do cooperate despite 
different inclinations on a certain US policy, it shows the strategic nature of security 
and defence issues. Proving that there has been strict mutual disagreement over a 
certain policy is thus not necessary. The stance disagreement or agreement with US 
policy will be found through analysis of official government documents and 
statements as well as newspapers and other relevant publications. Expert 
publications will, however, be the main source utilized. The expert publication are 
written by both European and US scholars on transatlantic relations. 
When attempting to identify the mechanism explaining the occurrence of an 
issue (i.e. the research question) and with the hypothesis of this paper (EU 
disagreement with US foreign policy fuels political will for defence and security 
cooperation) the importance and difficulty of determining causal relationships 
comes to the fore. Attempting to determine causality in social sciences is a 
contentious issue. In this paper, as is usually the case in social science, any causal 
relationship will be considered probabilistic. It will be established by considering 
temporal ordering and correlation while working with a plausible causal 
mechanism. In other words, is the disagreement happening at the approximately 
same time as the change in security cooperation; what happened first between the 
change and the disagreement? (see Strömberg 2005, p. 50).   
3.2 Variables 
 
This subsection explains the choice of dependent and independent variables, as well 
as further operationalizations.  
The dependent variable is the degree of security and defence cooperation among 
the EU member states. The degree of cooperation will be relativized to itself in 
previous periods. 
In order to be able to better track and measure the degree of EU defence and 
security cooperation it will in this paper be operationalized as three institutionalized 
forms of cooperation: the Western European Union (WEU), the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the current Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). This approach is similar to that of Strömvik who analysed the EPC, 
European Political Cooperation, and subsequently the CFSP.  
The term ‘security’ is ambiguous; it can entail various conditions and must be 
defined. Personal security, state security, food security, human security—they are 
all relevant add-ons depending on the focal point of the research. This paper utilizes 
the term ‘security’ liberally throughout the text, and the term consistently refers to 
state security. This is in line with Strömvik’s (2005) work. 
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When analysing the institutionalized cooperation the chosen indicators are 
treaties, declarations & strategies and military action undertaken within the 
frameworks (e.g. WEU/ESDP/CSDP military operations). The variables are 
presented over time in separate sections. 
There are certainly shortfalls to defining European security cooperation as the 
three types of institutionalized cooperation that is the WEU, the ESDP and the 
CSDP—such as missing out on cooperation outside of those constructs. Institutions 
created to facilitate the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSPD, (such as the 
European Defence Agency, EDA) will be of interest to analyse, however. 
Finally, the testable proposition of this paper is that when EU member states 
disagree with a US foreign policy, security cooperation among the EU members 
should intensify.   
3.3 Data 
In this paper the diplomatic history of EU-US relations is analysed, starting in 1991 
and through 2014. This is the same approach Strömvik utilizes, but with a different 
time span. When describing the transatlantic relations over time I rely on secondary 
material in the form of books and articles written by scholars on the subject. The 
scholars are prominent in their field and are both Europeans and Americans. This 
alleviates concerns about biased or one-sided material. Furthermore, choosing a 
single case runs the risk of selection bias (see King et al., p. 128 ff.). Looking at 
multiple cases over an extended time period alleviates this issue and is done in this 
paper. Jones puts it in other words: “[t]his time-series approach should counter the 
criticism that scholarly work on European security cooperation is methodologically 
problematic because it is a single case.” (Jones, 2007, p. 14).  
The treaties are handled in a similar fashion to the transatlantic relations; I 
mainly rely on secondary material for the political situation surrounding 
negotiations or other political action. First-hand material in the form of the treaties 
discussed are, however, utilized and referenced. 
Data for the security and defence cooperation are found for the respective 
indicators. For military actions data from the CSDP Map and Kreutz data set are 
utilized. The CSDP Map has data from 2003 through 2014. This data exclusively 
includes missions performed within the ESDP/CSDP framework, meaning a 
selection of their data is not needed. The Kreutz data set stretches from 1991 
through 2008 and includes all military actions of the EU members, all military 
action presented in the Kreutz data set are therefore not utilized in this paper. The 
data chosen from the Kreutz data set includes missions undertaken within the WEU 
framework and the ESDP framework. In short, only data on military missions 
undertaken within one of the three institutionalized forms of military cooperation 
(WEU/ESDP/CSDP) are considered for this paper.  
The data on the various treaties are primarily first hand material, i.e. the official 
treaties. They are complemented with second hand material in the form of analyses. 
The same approach is used for declarations and strategies. 
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4 EU security and transatlantic 
relations 
It is remarkable that European governments collectively have doubled the number of troops 
deployed abroad within the past decade, with so little national or Europe-wide debate on the 
implications of this development. (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 179) 
 
The words of Giergerich and Wallace above serve well to introduce a discussion on 
EU security and defence cooperation. In the previous chapters the hypothesis was 
explained, discussed and situated in the broader literature. The method used to 
answer the research question was also presented. This section will go over the 
relevant information needed to evaluate the hypothesis. The analysis is kept in its 
own subsection in this chapter. The reason for separating the more descriptive 
sections and the analysis is to allow the reader to better assess the analysis. In other 
words, to alleviate concerns about intersubjectivity.  
To recapitulate, I hypothesise that US foreign policy and transatlantic relations 
are key to understanding the evolvement of the European security and defence 
cooperation. Specifically, the disagreements and the disunity between the EU and 
the US over US foreign policy are crucial in inducing political will among the EU 
members to cooperate on matters of security and defence. In order to be able to 
evaluate this hypothesis this section therefore outlines the transatlantic relations 
over time. It also outlines important changes to the European security and defence 
cooperation.  
In this section I start out by presenting the different indicators of cooperation 
(military actions, treaties, declarations & strategies) as well the history of the 
transatlantic relations. These are presented in separate subsections. After the 
sections covering the data are presented the analysis follows to tie the sections 
together. This chapter ends with a timeline which provides a more accessible 
overview.  
The next section presents the different indicators over time. The section 
presenting the transatlantic history below is, out of necessity, a relatively brief one. 
The same, unfortunately, goes for the changes to European security and defence 
cooperation. I have identified what I believe are key changes to the cooperation and 
key events affecting the transatlantic relations. Below I present this first in text, then 
with the timeline mentioned above. The timeline has each key event plotted and 
illustrates the text graphically. It should be consulted to gain an overview of the 
text. 
4.1 The indicators 
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This chapter will present the different indicators of changing levels of European 
security and defence cooperation. Whitman’s quote in the beginning of this chapter 
points to that the ‘security landscape’ of Europe is changing. In fact, the European 
security and defence cooperation has grown remarkably in the post-Cold War years 
(Jones, 2007, p. 181; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004). The following subsections will 
present the indicators of the changes utilized in this paper.  
4.1.1 Treaties 
In this section the treaties are presented chronologically. Not all years are included, 
however. Rather, it is a selection of the years and treaties deemed most relevant for 
the development of the EU security and defence cooperation. 
 
1991-1992: The Treaty on European Union and the WEU 
 
In 1992 a crucial step was taken for increased EU integration across Europe; a 
document was drafted which laid the groundwork for the future of the European 
Union’s cooperation on matters of security and defence (Jones, 2007, p. 82 ff.). This 
document was the Maastricht Treaty and was signed in February 1992 and effective 
as of November 1993. It is a key document for the EU project and is more formally 
known as the Treaty on European Union, TEU3 (see EU legislation and glossary 
no. 1). This treaty defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one 
out of the three pillars of the EU and importantly referred to a common defence 
policy for the EU (EUISS, no. 1; Treaty on European Union (article 24); EU 
legislation and glossary no. 2; Whitman, 2004, p. 434; EU legislation no. 1). The 
Treaty on European Union, TEU, was a step towards a harmonized EU foreign 
policy and was crucial in order to deepen the cooperation on security and defence. 
The TEU was crucial for deepened security cooperation since “issues of military 
security and defence were to be discussed in the confines of the EC for the first 
time” (Whitman, 2004, p. 432). Thus, the TEU not only showed the intentions of 
the Europeans powers to cooperate on these matters but also paved the way for such 
an institutional development.  
Further developments to be made in the future for a more developed security 
and defence policy area were being prepared for with the help of the TEU. Under 
Title V, Provisions on a common foreign and security policy, the following is 
declared: “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence”4. This was a significant step for the future development of 
the ESDP and the CSDP. Mentioning a common EU defence in the TEU was, 
however, a contentious issue, and needed to be somewhat distanced from the rest 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm  
4 Available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm 
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of the political integration project5. The distancing was achieved by adding article 
J.4.2: “The Union request the Western Union (WEU), which is integral part of the 
development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the 
institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.”6 
The Western European Union, WEU, which was mentioned in article J.4.2 was 
a European defence organization predating the ESDP. It “provided a ready-made 
mechanism for the member states to exploit” and was a complement to NATO, 
rather than a duplicate or rival (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 ff.). The influence of the 
WEU on international security and defence policy was, however, minimal 
(Schleich, 2014, p. 187). The nature of WEU as non-rival and complementary to 
NATO, alleviated transatlantic tension somewhat in regards to this nascent 
European defence project. Apart from being the ‘vehicle’ of European security and 
defence development, the WEU was also a “means to strengthen the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance – the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)” 
(Whitman, 2004, p. 433). In other words, the European states managed to cooperate 
on security and defence policy. In doing so they strengthened the European member 
states’ standing within NATO (through the ESDI) as well as strengthened the EU’s 
capabilities in international security management, by utilizing the WEU as the 
security and defence institution of the EU.  
 A perceived advantage of utilizing the WEU as a defence and security 
institutional framework was that it was an intergovernmental rather than a 
supranational organization. The intergovernmental framework helped de-sensitize 
the issue for the member states on a national level by preserving national 
sovereignty on the issue of defence and security (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 f.). This 
has been a recurring organizational structure in the developments, first of the ESDP 
and subsequently of the CSDP.  
 
1994 – 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, Continuation of separation between 
WEU and NATO 
 
The progress made on the cooperation on security and defence was seen as slow, 
and “the incapability of the EU during the Balkan Wars showed the necessity to 
give the Union more means and instruments for action” (Schleich, 2014, p. 188). 
The unhappiness of some states with the capabilities of the WEU during the Balkan 
crisis fuelled the debate on a European common defence (Jones, 2007, p 87; 
Whitman, 2004, p. 435). The gap between the expectations and capabilities that was 
felt during the Balkan crisis opened up for the next step in the cooperation process 
and the desire to deepen the common EU defence using the WEU resulted in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5This issue was especially sensitive for Ireland and Denmark. Denmark actually opted itself out of continued 
European security cooperation in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992 (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 f.; Pedersen in 
Bailes et al., 2006, p. 37). For a thorough discussion on Denmark’s reasons for this ‘opt-out’, see Pedersen’s 
chapter, chapter 1, in Bailes et al (2006). 
6 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm 
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important passages in the Treaty of Amsterdam7, ToA, drafted in June 1997 
(Schleich, 2014, p. 188; Whitman, 2004, p. 435). The ToA amends the Treaty on 
European Union, TEU, and made significant changes regarding the future of 
European defence and security. ToA strengthens the commitment of the EU to 
military security and defence in several ways. Firstly, a key development was that 
the former ‘neutral’ states—Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland—now accepted 
the development of a military security and defence to be included in the ToA, and 
thus amend the Treaty of European Union. However, the “Finnish and Swedish 
governments in particular did feel some discomfiture at the existence of military 
security within the EU and were keen to promote crisis management as the most 
important practical task that the EU could undertake and it was their initiative to 
include the Petersberg tasks in the ToA” (Whitman, 2004, p. 435). This is an 
example of how the issue of a common security and defence policy can be framed, 
and new objectives added, to help the policy to fit the interest of all member states, 
realizing they face different security situations and domestic political realities.8 An 
example of such an operation was when, in 1998, the WEU was tasked by the EU 
to “undertake three activities: monitor the situation in Kosovo via the Satellite 
Centre; undertake action in assistance for mine clearing in Croatia; and study the 
feasibility of international police operations to assist the government in Albania and 
then to implement.” (Whitman, 2004, p. 434).  
Returning to the Treaty of Amsterdam it was significant in several other ways 
as well. For one it included the creation of the position of the High Representative9, 
HR, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP. The first HR appointed 
was Javier Solana, who was a former Secretary General for NATO. Solana was also 
appointed Secretary General of the WEU at the same time, making Solana the head 
of both CFSP and WEU (today the HR heads the CFSP and the CSDP). The Treaty 
of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999 and was, in essence, 
a compromise between member states wanting a deeper security cooperation and 
states who did not want any further development (Whitman, 2004, p. 435 f.). The 
new Treaty of Amsterdam was a part of making the EU militarily operational. 
Doing so the EU took one more step towards autonomy in the field of security and 
defence, without detaching from NATO, however (Schleich, 2014, p. 188). 
 
2001 – The Treaty of Nice and EDA, strengthening the cooperation  
 
The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2003. The treaty 
further strengthened the EU as an autonomous actor in the field of international 
security and defence (Jones, 2007; Wivel, 2005, p. 400 ff.; Whitman, 2004, p. 439). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 Available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm  
8 For an in-depth analysis on the rationale of the Nordic countries in solving their security concerns, see Bailes et 
al, 2006. This book also provides overviews of the Nordic countries and their relationships to European security 
institutions.  
9 For background on the post, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/background/high-representative/index_en.htm  
  15 
Interestingly, a declaration attached to the treaty made it clear that the ratification 
of the Treaty of Nice was not a precondition for the ESDP to become operational. 
In other words, the creation of the ESDP could not be stopped by refusing to ratify 
the ToN (Whitman, 2004, p. 439 ff.). The declaration thus showed the importance 
placed on the security cooperation, and also helped put some distance between 
ratifying the ToN and the creation of the more sensitive issue of the ESDP.  
In 2004, roughly a year after the ESDP became operational, the European 
Defence Agency was established. The purpose of establishing this agency was, inter 
alia, to strengthen the EU defence industry and improve EU’s defence capabilities 
(in other words, to improve the capabilities of the member states (EUISS, no. 2, p. 
63)) as well as to help implement the ESDP/CSDP (see Council Joint Action 
2004/551/CFSP10). This was another step towards strengthening the security 
cooperation in the long run by empowering the EU defence industry, thus ensuring 
the Europeans remain in greater control of their own future capabilities. It was also 
an ‘institutional lubricant’, helping make the institutional steps necessary to 
improve the ESDP/CSDP.  
 
2007 – The Treaty of Lisbon enters into force and ESDP becomes CSDP 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, ToL, was agreed upon in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. 
The ToL introduced several developments to the ESDP. A visible change was 
relabelling the cooperation CSDP, Common Security and Defence Policy. This 
change was coupled with substantial changes. In general, the developments 
clarified “the EU’s ability to speak on international issues and give it more political 
weight and stability respecting NATO commitments.” (Sola, in Laursen et al., 2009, 
p. 202). According to a prominent scholar on the CSDP, Anand Menon, a common 
observation among EU defence analysts was that the primary objective of the 
Treaty of Lisbon agreed upon in 2007 was to allow for the EU to be a more effective 
global actor (Menon, 2011, p. 75). “Of the 62 amendments it makes to its 
predecessors, the Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht Treaty, 25 apply to provisions 
on foreign and security policy. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
was not only given more space than the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) that preceded it; its remit was expanded to include joint disarmament 
operations, post-conflict stabilisation and, if these were not taxing enough of 
themselves, the ‘fight against terrorism’.” (Menon, 2011, p. 75).  
With the Treaty of Lisbon several important amendments were made to the TEU 
that more specifically strengthened the military cooperation of the EU member 
states. Above some general changes are mentioned. Here follows some more 
tangible examples. One such example of the strengthening of the defensive aspect 
of the CSDP was the inclusion of the ‘solidarity clause’. The ‘solidarity clause’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/council_joint_action_2004_551_cfsp.pdf  
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(article 188 R) states that member states ‘shall act jointly if a Member State is the 
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The 
Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military 
resources made available by the Member states”11. This clause, then, more 
explicitly shows the direction EU defence strategy is heading and where it is 
currently at. With the US wanting EU to take on a larger burden regarding the 
defence of Europe, this could be seen as a step in that direction (Nielsen, 2013; 
Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014).  
The Treaty of Lisbon extended the role of the HR to include the role of the Vice-
President of the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon also expanded the 
responsibilities of the HR (EUISS, no. 2, p. 61).12 The European External Action 
Service, EEAS, is created to help the High Representative fulfil the mandate of the 
job (EUISS, no. 2, p. 61). “The creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in 2010 offered the opportunity to bring under the same roof the diverse 
policies, tools, staff and working cultures from the various EU institutions and 
member states dealing with or engaged in CSDP” (Balfour in Gross & Menon, 
2013, p. 45). The main point of addressing this change is to illustrate the continued 
belief in the system by the EU members.  
The following quote is an analysis by the EUISS on the importance and 
limitations of the Lisbon Treaty. The words of the EUISS end the section on treaties. 
The section following is on declarations and strategies.  
 
. . . [I]nstitutional engineering can only achieve so much if political consensus on 
making the Union a strong, autonomous international actor in the field of security and 
defence is not forthcoming. From this standpoint, the reforms envisaged by the Lisbon 
Treaty are of particular importance. They create the institutional conditions for much 
more joined up policy-making at EU level, bridging the intergovernmental and the 
Community dimension as well as the national and the European levels of decision-
making. That said, ultimately, institutional reform cannot provide a conclusive answer 
to a political question. (EUISS, no. 2, p. 65) 
 
The Mutual Defence Clause states that “If a Member State is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an 
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” 
It further states that: “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be 
consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, 
for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective 
defence and the forum for its implementation.” (TEU, article 42) 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT&from=SV ,  
12 http://eeas.europa.eu/background/high-representative/index_en.htm  
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Quille points out that the text13 was written to please three categories of states; 
those “seeking a mutual defence commitment [. . .] seeking to protect their 
traditional neutral status [. . .] wanting to ensure that the article would not 
undermine NATO” (2008, p. 8).  
The ToL effectively closed the WEU by adding the Mutual Assistance Clause. 
The WEU officially closed down in June 2011.  
4.1.2 Declarations and strategies14 
 
1992 The Petersberg Declaration 
 
In 1992 the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union Ministerial 
Council present the Petersberg Declaration which defines the ‘Petersberg tasks’. 
The Petersberg Declaration “have become the paradigm which have conditioned 
both the ambitions of the ESDP and also informed the force structure deemed 
appropriate for realizing the EU’s military security ambitions.” (Whitman, 2004, p. 
434). The ‘Petersberg tasks’ can be defined as political goals. They were set up to 
be met over time with the creation of new institutions (Whitman, 2004, p. 433). The 
tasks were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht 
Treaty, TEU)—marking the political weight the tasks hold—and the WEU 
subsequently created institutions throughout the mid-1990s to meet the tasks 
(Whitman, 2004, p. 433). The ‘Petersberg Declaration’ and the political goals 
known as the ‘Petersberg tasks’ are crucial to the institutional development of the 
EU defence and security cooperation as they laid much of the groundwork for future 
developments, in part by creating new institutions. 
 
1996 – 1999 Berlin Plus, Saint-Malo Declaration, Cologne and Helsinki 
 
In 1994 a process was started to allow the WEU to use certain NATO assets and 
capabilities, especially through the Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF. The CJTF 
is a “deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for 
specific contingency operations. It could cover a wide range of potential tasks 
including humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement.”15 This 
development is important to highlight since it allowed for operations to be run by 
the WEU members without including the US. This development was therefore 
important in the further development of a European Security and Defence Identity, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796/20080513ATT28796EN.p
df  
14 Do see Kurowska & Breuer (2012) which provides food for thought with a discussion on the importance of 
studying strategies in international relations. 
15 NATO 2: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9604-2.htm, accessed 2/5-2015   
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ESDI (Whitman, 2004, p. 433 f.). The process of allowing WEU to use NATO 
assets made slow progress and it “was not until May 1997 that NATO’s Military 
Committee designated the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(DSACEUR) as the principal point of contact between the NATO Strategic 
Commands and the WEU” (Whitman, 2004, p. 433 f.). Although a seemingly small 
step, this was, in fact, another step towards greater EU autonomy from the US in 
matters of international security.  
The years 1996-1999 were marked by the continued separation between NATO 
and the EU member states. This “continuing separation between NATO and the EU 
was illustrated by the fact that the first ever formal meeting between the EU 
Presidency and the NATO Secretary-General only took place in December 1998.” 
(Whitman, 2004, p. 434).  
In 1996 the NATO Berlin Council was held (see NATO no. 1). It was agreed at 
the ministerial meeting of the NATO council that the Western European Union 
(WEU) would see to the creation of a European ‘section’ within the NATO 
framework. This ‘section’ within the NATO framework was the development of 
the aforementioned ESDI, the European Security and Defence Identity.  
Increasing the security cooperation was not without hiccups, even within the 
EU. The British were outspokenly reluctant to increase the EU cooperation on 
security and defence, and preferred an increased level of cooperation on EU defence 
within the NATO framework instead (e.g. through the ESDI). However, despite this 
outspoken reluctance an important understanding was reached in 1998 between the 
two European military powers France and the UK in the Franco-British summit in 
Saint Malo. In this summit common political ground was found between the two 
powers, and in fact it “was the first time that the EU’s two most significant military 
powers had agreed such a bilateral statement”, in effect “kick-start[ing] the 
development of what was to become the ESDP” (Whitman, 2004, p. 436). The 
summit at Saint Malo “famously calls for the European Union to develop ‘the 
capacity for autonomous action’” (Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 383; also, see the Saint-
Malo Declaration) and set the course of action to taking the formal decision at the 
next European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999. The importance of the summit 
and the agreement between France and Britain should not be underestimated; it 
changed several European governments’ positions towards a European security and 
defence policy (Tiilikainen in Bailes et al., 2006, p. 57). Jones notes that the summit 
“added a common defence policy to the second pillar” (2007, p. 85).  
At the meeting in Cologne, then, the ESDP was subsequently created. It was 
also decided that the role of the WEU (which had been separate from the EU but 
utilized as an instrument) was to be incorporated into the EU. This effectively 
closed the WEU. The Cologne European Council took the expected formal decision 
that the EU should be able to act autonomously in matters of defence when NATO 
decided not to (Wivel, 2005, p. 400; Jones, 2007, p. 181).  It was also at this summit 
that Javier Solana was appointed to be the first High Representative (EUISS no. 2, 
pp. 13, 117; Whitman, 2004, p. 434 ff.). Within the ESDP framework the 
foundation for the EU Intelligence Center, EU SITCEN, is laid. This is another step 
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towards a more autonomous and capable EU within the field of international 
security, being able to rely less on American capabilities and more on European 
ones. The European Union Institute for International Security Studies notes that the 
“difference from 1999 onwards was that the EU was not a military alliance like the 
WEU (or NATO), but a political Union which brought much more broad 
diplomatic, political and economic weight to the table.” (EUISS no. 2, p. 128).  
The Helsinki European Council, which took place in the other half of 1999, 
underscored the determination with which the Council sought to develop an 
autonomous capacity to act where NATO declined to act. The meeting resulted in 
an important goal, known as the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’. This goal was, in short, 
to be able to muster the capacity necessary to achieve the ‘Petersberg tasks’ by 2003 
(this was estimated to be in correspondence to 50,000-60,000 troops). This was not 
to be a ‘European army’, but rather a pool of national resources which the EU 
through ESDP may utilize (EUISS, no. 3, p. 90).  
 
2001 – 2008 Berlin Plus and the European Security Strategy  
 
Improving the capacity of the EU to act autonomously has remained a contentious 
issue. For one, it strained the EU-NATO relationship. There were ongoing 
discussions between the EU and NATO on how to make sure the ESDP and NATO 
complemented each other, rather than duplicated one another. The culmination of 
the talks about the arrangements between the two organisations has come to be 
known as the ‘Berlin Plus agreement’ (the talks began in 1996). In the beginning 
the talks were held between NATO and the WEU in Berlin, hence the name (EUISS, 
no. 2, p. 128). When the ESDP effectively replaced the WEU following the Cologne 
summit in 1999, “it was only a matter of time before the EU would replace the 
WEU as the negotiator with NATO on the ‘Berlin Plus’ talks, and in January 2001 
the EU and NATO initiated direct talks on Berlin Plus.” (EUISS, no. 2, p. 128). In 
2002 the ‘Berlin Plus agreement’ is reached. The agreement is an agreement that 
the EU may use certain NATO capabilities where necessary for EU operations (Sola 
in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 201; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163; Schleich, 2014, 
p. 188; EUISS, no. 3, p. 91). In 2003 the Berlin Plus agreement enters into force 
(Sola in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 201; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163).  
In 2003 the EU members agreed on the first European Security Strategy, the 
ESS (EUISS, no. 2, p. 24; Toje, 2010, p. 76). The ESS was drafted partly as a 
counterpart to the American National Security Strategy of 2002, and partly to be a 
foundation for future EU cooperation on security (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 
167 f.). An important phrase in this strategic document is that the EU intended to 
“share in the responsibility for global security” (ESS 1, p. 1, emphasis added).  An 
important aspect of the ESS is that it “reinforces the elements of combination of 
hard and soft power” (see Sola in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 202). This is a pointer that 
the EU is keen on having a multifaceted toolbox to be able to autonomously deal 
with problems. 
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The ESS document was a strategic framework important for the European 
Security and Defence Policy, ESDP (EUISS no. 2, p. 15). Or in the words of a 
scholar on the subject; “The ESS is important, as Sven Biscop and Jan Joel 
Andersson have argued, because it sums up the EU’s political project, its hopes and 
ambitions. Its significance lies not so much in what the document actually states as 
in what it is seen to represent.” (Toje, 2010, p. 76). In short, the document helped 
in framing the strategic direction the EU and the ESDP would follow.  
In 2008 the European Council published a review of the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS); the Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, RI-ESS, titled Providing Security in a Changing World.16 RI-ESS 
comments on the changes in EU strategic thinking and shortcomings since the 
publication of the ESS (Toje, 2010, p. 76 ff.). The review of the security strategy 
has a particular focus on the development of capabilities for the ESDP (EUISS, no. 
2, p. 24 f.). The review of the security strategy was thus another step in the ongoing 
development of the security and defence cooperation.  
Apart from the overarching security strategy and its revised edition mentioned 
above, more specific security strategies have been developed as well. One such 
important strategy was the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy and action plan. This 
framework document helped devise a regional approach to security and defence 
(EUISS, no. 2, p. 25 f., 148 ff.). It showed the EU’s continued commitment to being 
a global security actor.  
 
2014 Selected EU Strategies  
 
In 2014 two important strategies were adopted. Firstly, the EU Strategy on the Gulf 
of Guinea17 (EUSGG) which aims to achieve “peace, security and prosperity” in 
the region of the Gulf of Guinea. This is to be achieved through a multifaceted 
approach, in short through a combination of hard and soft power. It is to be done by 
partnering with the African Union, AU, and supporting its regional organisations, 
such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States18).19 
The aim is to help build stable institutions capable of handling the issues 
independently of the EU. The importance of this strategy lies in the EU members 
continuing to work through the CSDP. This may come to strengthen the 
cooperation, with the CSDP becoming a more normalized part of the EU 
membership. 
The European Union Maritime Security Strategy20 is written to be in accordance 
with the ESS (EUMSS, p. 2) and the purpose of this strategy is to “secure the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 RI-ESS, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf, 
accessed 24/4 – 2015 
17 EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_guinea/docs/strategy_en.pdf  
18 ECOWAS official site, available at: www.ecowas.int/, accessed 20/6 – 2015 
19 EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf_guinea/docs/strategy_en.pdf  
20 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT  
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maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States against a plethora of 
risks and threats in the global maritime domain.” (EUMSS, p. 3). It is important to 
note the word ‘global’. This is a sign of intent to continue striving towards 
becoming more of a global actor.  
The last EU strategy to be addressed here is the EU strategy for security and 
development in the Sahel21 (EUSSS) and it stretches over a 10 year perspective. It 
was implemented in 2011. A key perspective of the EU strategy is that security and 
development are inseparable in the Sahel region. Therefore, in order for the EU to 
help develop the region economically and politically, military capabilities are 
necessary. The overall goal is to reduce terrorist threats, limit international criminal 
networks operating in the region, as well as enhance the overall political stability 
and security.22  
4.1.3 Military actions 
This section notes the military actions but only briefly comments on them. The 
military actions are the EU member military actions taken over the time period 
1991-2014 within WEU/ESDP/CSDP. To clarify, there have been additional 
military actions taken by EU member states. However, these actions have been 
made in other contexts than under the EU framework for cooperation. Examples 
include unilateral actions or NATO operations. Due to their character those actions 
are disregarded since this paper analyses institutionalized European security 
cooperation. The selection of operations below was made utilizing the data from 
Kreutz data set and the CSDP Operations Map by the EUISS.  
 
WEUDAM 
WEUDAM was a mine clearance operation to assist Croatia at Croatian request. 
The mission was funded by the EU, with nine military personnel and lasted between 
1999 through late 2001. It was conducted within the WEU framework. 23  
 
Operation Concordia 
After the Berlin-Plus agreement, the EU took over peacekeeping and stabilisation 
responsibilities in Macedonia from NATO—utilizing the newly operational 
ESDP—between March 2003 and November 2003.24  
 
Operation Artemis 
In June 2003 the EU sent 1,800 troops to Eastern Congo in a military operation 
called Operation Artemis, marking the first long-range EU military operation a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf 
22 http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf  
23 http://www.weu.int/History.htm, accessed 22/6 – 2015 
24 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/mission-description/index_en.htm, 
accessed 5/5 – 2015; do also see Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163; Whitman, 2006, p. 446  
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success in September 2003. The operation was done per request from the UN 
Secretary-General of the UN.25 The mission of the operation was to stabilise a 
region in Eastern Congo, effectively buying time for a larger UN peacekeeping 
force which was being put together and deployed. Of specific importance for the 
ESDP was that this was the first autonomous EU military operation outside of 
Europe. It did not rely on NATO or other assistance (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, 
p. 163 ff.; Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8; Whitman, 2006, p. 446 f.) and was a “high 
risk, high profile, politically important mission that set the stage for future ESDP 
developments, both in Africa and beyond” (Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8).   
 
EUFOR Operation Althea  
EUFOR Operation Althea began in 2004 (that is, roughly a year after the ESDP was 
operational). The EU force (or EUFOR) was authorized by the UN Security Council 
with the adoption of resolution 1575. It replaced NATO forces on the ground and 
initially consisted of 7000 troops. It is a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
and has three main missions:  
o To provide capacity-building and training support to the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
o To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH 
o To provide support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.26 
The operation is conducted under the Berlin-Plus agreements. Thus, the EU through 
CSDP and NATO work closely. However, EU maintains control over the political 
and strategic aspects of the operation. 27 The operation is a sign that the EU is trying 
to take a greater autonomous responsibility for European security management.   
 
EUFOR DR Congo 
EUFOR DR Congo was a military operation conducted to secure elections in DR 
Congo. The EU responded to a UN request in assembling a military force to secure 
the upcoming elections in DR Congo. Importantly, it deepened the relationship 
between the EU and the UN and thus gaining further international approval of the 
CSDP construct. There were, however, hiccups delaying the operation, such as 
distribution of costs and availability of troops. The mission started and concluded 
in 2006 (Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8).28  
 
EUFOR Tchad 
EUFOR Tchad was a military operation that was launched in 2008 and ended in 
2009. It involved 3700 troops and had as main objectives to facilitate delivery of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm, accessed 7/5 – 2015   
26 http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-
sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134, accessed 4/5-2015  
27 http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-
sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134, accessed 4/5-2015  
28 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/index_en.htm, accessed 5/5-2015  
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humanitarian aid, protect UN, EU and other humanitarian staff as well as protect 
civilians. In 2009 the UN took over the operation.  
EUFOR Tchad further helped improve the UN-EU relations. The mission was 
the most multi-national EU operation in Africa to-date, with 23 member states being 
represented in some manner.29 
 
EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta 
Operation Atalanta became operational in 2008, and was as of the end of 2014 
ongoing. The operation is based on several UN resolutions and aims to deter piracy, 
monitor fishing activities and protect vulnerable vessels. Its overarching goal is to 
improve maritime security and capacity in the region of the Horn of Africa, mainly 
along the coastline of Somalia. Its area of operations is vast and is a sign of the 
global presence of EU forces.30  
 
EUFOR Libya 
EUFOR Libya is the name of a never conducted military operation (which may still 
be conducted) in Libya if requested by the UN. The decision to intervene militarily 
if requested in Libya was reached in April 2011 but never acted upon.31 EU thus 
never intervened militarily in Libya through the CSDP. However, the UK and 
France intervened militarily and unilaterally in Libya within the NATO framework 
(Menon, 2011, p. 75).  
The size and geographic location of the Libyan conflict did actually fit well for 
the design of the CSDP framework (Howorth, 2014, p. 405; Menon, 2011, p. 75). 
In fact, “the classic scenario for which the Common Security and Defence Policy 
had been planning was a medium intensity military intervention in the EU’s 
immediate neighbourhood, either with access to NATO assets (Berlin Plus) or 
autonomously. The ‘fit’ between the Libyan case and the ideal-type CSDP mission 
cannot be overstated.” (Howorth, 2014, p. 405).  
 As a result, the EU’s inability to quickly and decisively act was, for some 
observers, seen as a crucial weakness of the security cooperation. It was a sign of 
intra-European divisions crippling the CSDP, according to some analysts (Nielsen, 
2013, p. 98). Others went further and proclaimed the failure to act as the effective 
end of the CSDP (Menon, 2011, p. 76). The operation did, however, indicate that 
the CSDP was not a solid security organisation to count on.  
 
EUFOR RCA 
EUFOR RCA is a UN mandated EU peacekeeping mission in the Central African 
Republic, or CAR. It was operational as of early 2014 and was at the end of 2014 
still ongoing. The goal of the military operation is to stabilise a region called the 
Bangui area to allow for humanitarian aid and aims to hand over to ‘African 
partners’.32  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/mission-description/index_en.htm, 
accessed 5/5 – 2015 
30 http://eunavfor.eu/mission/, accessed 4/5 – 2015   
31 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-libya/index_en.htm, accessed 10/5 – 2015 
32 http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rca/index_en.htm  
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The EUFOR RCA is another show of EU’s intent of global impact and 
autonomous action.  
4.2 The transatlantic relations  
These events should serve as impulses toward increased cooperation by boosting the political will 
to attempt to exert European influence over international events. (Strömvik, 2005, p. 146)  
 
In this section the transatlantic disunity between 1991 through 2014 is presented. 
Note that only the periods of discord are presented. As a result the transatlantic 
relationship may appear to be in a constant crisis. This has, of course, not been the 
case. Just as Strömvik notes in the quote above, the EU-US relations are considered 
impulses which spark EU willingness to cooperate. The analysis of the connection 
between EU-US relations and the development of the CSDP is however kept in the 
analysis section. This is done in order to allow for intersubjectivity.   
This section starts out in the midst of a worsening of EU-US relations. The 
worsening of the transatlantic relations was mainly due to the Iran-Contras scandal 
which erupted in 1986. The scandal severely damaged the credibility of the US 
foreign policy in the eyes of the Europeans (Strömvik, 2005, p. 167).  
The poor transatlantic relations may be considered the baseline against which 
the ongoing relations may be judged. The uncertainties following the end of the 
Cold War is a backdrop to consider when analysing decisions made.  
 
1991-1995 Iran-Contras, Yugoslavia and a relationship adrift  
 
The uncertainty following the end of the Cold War was tangible in Europe. A key 
worry for the Europeans at that time was the risk of a withdrawal of US troops from 
Europe. The US hegemonic position as security provider for the Europeans 
following WWII for the Europeans was not as much of a certainty following the 
end of the Cold War. The question if US protection of Europe would continue 
following the end of the Cold War was raised and discussed (Lundestad in Andrews 
(ed.), 2005, pp. 14—16; Calleo, 2008, p. 69). In fact, when the EC members were 
discussing “the introduction of issues of defence policy into the new Treaty on 
European Union [i.e. TEU, the Maastricht Treaty], the European capital cities 
received a letter, drawn up by the US State Department, warning against building 
up a European defence identity within the EU and containing implicit threats about 
force withdrawal from the US side.” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 169). This American 
response to European talks on creating an EU security organisation is indeed 
noteworthy. 
During the uncertain times following the Cold War, a new war broke out in the 
former Yugoslavia. As the conflict intensified, the Europeans and the US disagreed 
on how to tackle the situation. This was especially noticeable between 1993 and 
1995. Bill Clinton was the new president—preceded by George H. W. Bush—and 
with the new administration the conflict in the Balkans was framed as a conflict 
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with an aggressor and another state, Serbia and Bosnia. EU instead attempted to 
show that the conflict was more complex than the US official way of framing it 
(Strömvik, 2005, p. 171; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 32 f.).  
With the two different interpretations of the conflict followed two different 
ways of tackling it. The separate policies for solving the conflict lead to serious 
disagreements between EU and the US. The US wanted a more hands-on approach 
which included limited airstrikes and a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian arms 
imports. This US policy, often called the ‘lift and strike’ policy did not receive any 
support from the EU. These disputes mainly took place in 1993 (Dumbrell, 2010, 
p. 270 ff.; Strömvik, 2005, p. 172).  
In 1994 the US administration became less patient with the caution the 
European states displayed in their approach to the conflict. The US asserted a more 
unilateralist approach to the Yugoslavian crisis, and “conducted, through NATO, 
five air strikes against Serb positions in early 1994” (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 271).  This 
more decisive approach followed the more consensus seeking approach pursued 
previously. The approach had been critiqued in the US that the US could and should 
act rather than seek to do everything together (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; 
Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, pp. 16 ff.). The situation following the end of 
the Cold War was unique and power relationships needed to be redefined. The 
Europeans wanted to act more autonomously but could not achieve what they 
wanted on their own yet. The US was still needed to ensure security (Gordon & 
Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, pp. 13 ff.).  
The different foreign policy approaches were tangible for the military force as 
well, with the Europeans perceiving the situation as being placed in more risky 
missions, adding to the political tension. This was linked to the different approaches 
to the situation in the Balkans, with the US favouring air attacks over occupation of 
the ground. The European forces lacked these air strike capabilities in comparison 
with the capabilities of the US. The European forces therefore mainly contributed 
to the ground forces instead, which was a better fit to the foreign policy approach 
of the European governments. With European forces placed on the ground, and 
doing the force protection missions, the Europeans felt the US placed them more 
directly at risk (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 166 ff.).   
Returning to the crisis in the Balkans in 1994, the US threatened to no longer 
be a part of the arms embargo, and tensions between EU and the US were renewed. 
In 1995, after the US played an increasingly active role in the peace talks, the 
Dayton peace agreement was finally signed. This marked the temporary end to the 
transatlantic disputes and disagreements over the Balkans (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 270 
ff.; Strömvik, 2005, p. 173).  However, the more unilateralist approach by the US 
to the Balkans in 1994 was in 1995 followed by a more general unilateral foreign 
policy approach. One reason for the nascent unilateralism was that the US congress 
was dominated by Republicans (who, as a collective, favoured a less multilateral 
approach) (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37; Dumbrell, 2010, p. 269). This change 
in the approach to foreign policy was presented in the US 1995 National Security 
Strategy, which is a key US foreign policy document. The 1995 National Security 
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Strategy stated that the US is “willing to act unilaterally when our national interests 
are most at stake” (NSS, 1995, p. 7). The EU instead preferred multilateral solutions 
(Gordon & Shapiro, 2005; Dumbrell, 2010). This difference in approach is a 
recurring theme of transatlantic tension.  
 
1996-1999 Handling rogue states and the Iraq controversy  
 
The transatlantic tensions that subsided somewhat following the Dayton peace 
agreement in 1995 arose again in 1996. The rising tension was mainly due to 
different approaches and policies on handling ‘rogue states’, where the US pursued 
a tougher, sanctions driven line and the Europeans promoted engagement in order 
to promote gradual political change (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 38 ff.).  
This difference in approach to ‘rogue states’ became a source of serious tension 
when two American civilian aircraft were shot down outside of Havana, in 
international airspace. The Americans pushed through the Helms-Burton act in 
Congress, and Clinton signed the act in March as a response to the downing of the 
planes. The Helms-Burton act, a federal US law officially known as The Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Act of 1996 (Libertad), was meant to tighten the sanctions 
already in place against Cuba and was an even tighter than before trade embargo. 
The main focus was on foreign investments (Smis, & Borght, 1999; CNN, no. 1; 
PBS, no. 1), and thus the act punished European companies doing business in Cuba 
(Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37). The Helms-Burton act was a piece of 
extraterritorial legislation, and its legality was disputed by the Europeans. In other 
words, a US bill was signed into law dictating foreign companies’ investments in 
Cuba (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; Strömvik, 2005, p. 175). The Act relied “on 
the U.S. position as the world’s most important participant in international 
economic markets to force foreign companies not to invest or trade with Cuba for 
fear of sacrificing their trade with the United States” (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 
229).  
Another similar source of transatlantic tension the very same year was how to 
handle Iran and Libya. The US signed a bill into law, the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 1996 (also known as the d’Amato Act, or ILSA), in the summer of 1996, a 
few months after the Helms-Burton act, aimed at regulating or blocking foreign 
investments in Libya and Iran, similar to the sanctions towards Cuba. Through the 
act the President of the US was required to impose sanctions toward any foreign 
company investing heavily in Iraq or Libya. This extraterritorial legislation was 
challenged by the Europeans who defied it by taking action within the World Trade 
Organisation, WTO (NYT, no. 1; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37; Smis & Borght, 
1999, p. 231 ff.).  
The unison EU response to these rather aggressive US foreign policy acts is 
noteworthy. Together they critiqued the legislation with consensus, and defied it, 
mainly through actions taken within WTO (Smis & Borght, 1999; Gordon & 
Shapiro, 2005, p. 39; Strömvik, 2005, p. 174).  
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The tensions created as a result of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts eased 
when a deal was made between the US and EU members in May 1998. The 
agreement of 1998 contained the establishment of a transatlantic partnership which 
would make political cooperation more effective, as well as “a package relating to 
the two Acts, by which the United States would limit the impact of certain 
provisions on European companies and citizens” (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231). 
The EU, in return, agreed to not pursue any further action in the WTO against the 
Acts (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231 ff.; Strömvik, p. 175). The Europeans disliked 
the unilateral approach of the US that the two Acts were testament to, and in the 
deal struck it was ensured that such future foreign policy actions using economic 
sanctions were not to be made (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231 ff.).  
In this time period, 1996-1999, there were simultaneously other sources 
straining the transatlantic relationship than the matter of the three ‘rogue states’ 
above. An important case is the Kosovo crisis that erupted with the Serbian 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in 1998. On this issue the 
US and the EU disagreed on the best foreign policy approach in EU’s close own 
neighbourhood. The US wanted a much tougher response, again, than the EU was 
ready to back, and demonstrated a will to lead decisively. The US pursued its 
tougher policy line of use of force against the Belgrade regime but wanted 
international support for this policy approach, and eventually the US got the UN to 
pass Resolution 1199 “which declared the situation a “threat to international peace 
and security”” (as quoted in Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 35). This resolution, then, 
legitimized force against the Belgrade regime, and paved the way for NATO forces 
to act (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 36).  
There were further issues straining the transatlantic relationship. The Iraq 
controversy erupted in 1996 with US missile strikes against ‘tactical targets’ in 
northern Iraq. The missile strikes were a response to Iraqi military intervening “in 
an intra-Kurdish dispute in the part of effectively autonomous northern Iraq that 
had been protected by U.S., U.K., and French air power since the 1991 Gulf war” 
(Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 40). The US decision to strike with cruise missiles in 
northern Iraq not only affected the transatlantic relationship negatively, but also 
highlighted a serious divide among the Europeans who failed to rally behind a 
unified policy response. The military action by the US was denounced by France, 
but not by the UK and the transatlantic, and intra EU, divide on the Iraq policy was 
made apparent (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 40 f.). Some analysts note that this may 
be part of a US strategy to divide EU members to weaken the prospects of a united 
security cooperation (Jones, 2007, p. 180). Whether or not it was indeed strategy 
the result was the same. The divide was apparent and its dividing effects were 
available for all to see.  
The change in US foreign policy stance from “assertive multilateralism to 
nascent unilateralism” (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 269) occurred throughout the 1990s, of 
which the foreign policy decisions above are testament to, and they were, at least 
in part, due to the growing relative power of the US. This growth in power worried 
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the Europeans adding to the tension in the transatlantic relations (Gordon & 
Shapiro, 2005, p. 37 f.).  
The growth in power was noticeable within NATO, where the US started to 
exercise more assertive leadership in NATO. For example, President Clinton 
pushed for new US identified threats to be included in NATO’s missions, such as 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the “development of European defense 
capabilities better equipped to deal with these new challenges” (Gordon & Shapiro, 
2005, p. 34). To pursue this goal, the US administration called for a new ‘Strategic 
Concept’ in 1999 for NATO which would recognize these new types of missions. 
It also put forward a Defence Capabilities Initiative to integrate European and US 
forces more, allowing EU forces to be more rapidly deployable. This new agenda 
the US put forth was met with reluctance by many Europeans who were worried of 
the military might of the US. The Europeans also considered NATO and the use of 
force the wrong solution to these ‘new’ challenges. In fact, some were concerned 
that the US might abuse its military might, which was increasing. The Europeans 
instead preferred and insisted to work through the UN. The US, however “refused 
to make Security Council authorization an absolute requirement for military action” 
(Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 35).  
NATO and EU have intensified their cooperation (Schleich, 2014). This was 
institutionalized with the adoption of Berlin-Plus, and over time “[t]he inter-
institutional cooperation has developed from parallel structures to more interwoven 
ones – from ‘interblocking’ to ‘interlocking intitutions’.” (Schleich, 2014, p. 198). 
Despite increased cooperation their relationship is still described by some analysts 
as an unresolved puzzle, with the future purpose of the two organisations remaining 
unclear (see e.g. Howorth, 2014).  
The years 1991-1999 were, in sum, a period of the US growing in power and 
military might, and a struggle of how to handle this new political reality, on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The failure to agree on how to handle Iraq had become a major 
divisive issue, in fact it had become one of the most divisive issues in the Atlantic 
alliance. There were several other divisive issues (e.g. over how to handle rogue 
states), and this increased frequency of transatlantic disagreements is a noteworthy 
feature of this period.  
Additionally, the Europeans were wary of the growing might of the US, and the 
US wanted to be more autonomous from—less constricted by—her allies, but with 
a continued strong support from them. This lead to clashes over several foreign 
policy issues described in the section above.  
 
2000-2008: Bush, 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq – US unilateralism revisited 
 
In the years preceding the Clinton presidency president G. W. Bush led the 
American government. Bush seemingly had little patience with the EU, as 
compared with Clinton, and favoured force over trade and careful diplomacy in 
dealing with rogue states or dictators. This was at odds with how the EU preferred 
to deal the issues and tension was sparked following the new US agenda of 
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unilateralism (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). In fact, “[i]n the new team’s view, 
the Clinton administration had too often followed a model of diplomacy [. . .] that 
unwisely sought to achieve allied, and especially transatlantic, consensus before 
making important foreign policy decisions. That model, they believed, belonged to 
a bygone era.” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). This mentality was connected to 
the increase in relative US power that started following the Cold War (Gordon & 
Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). This mentality is known as the “if you build it, they will 
come” doctrine. In short it meant that unilateral action by the US was followed by 
multilateral action (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49 ff.). In other words, the US set 
the agenda, pursued their preferred foreign policy action and calculated that the EU 
would follow. This was provoking for the EU members. 
In the midst of this new display of US power projection, the 9/11 attacks 
occurred. NATO’s article V was invoked, ensuring that EU members of NATO 
were prepared to meet this attack unified as an alliance together with the US. 
However, the US reaction to the 9/11 attacks was to lead unilaterally and not to be 
constricted by the alliance: “In Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
formulation, “the mission needs to define the coalition, and we ought not to think 
that a coalition should define the mission.” This, Europeans pointed out, was the 
very opposite of NATO’s founding principle. Former NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana [. . .] responded that “the alliance should determine the mission and 
not vice versa,” and complained that NATO had “invoked its most sacred covenant” 
and yet was totally ignored by American war planners.” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, 
p. 61 f.). This was another show of the new unilateralism and another blow to the 
Europeans who felt ignored (Andrews in Andrews (ed.), 2009, pp. 256 ff.).   
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US become intent on attacking Iraq in 2002. 
This worried the members of the EU members who continued to feel mistreated and 
under-appreciated. In the months leading up to the invasion, the US was in 
“something of a diplomatic war” with Germany and France (Strömvik, 2005, p. 
197; do also see Andrews (ed.), 2009). In general, the American US foreign policy 
was considered simplistic by the Europeans (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 67; 
Nielsen, 2013, p. 85 ff.). In 2003 the US invaded Iraq, dividing the European 
governments, with Germany and France remaining in strong opposition to the 
invasion and the British in a strong alliance with the US (Lundestad in Andrews 
(ed.), 2005, p. 9).   
The invasion of Iraq, the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction, and 
the problems that followed the invasion haunted the Bush administration and the 
transatlantic relations (Nielsen, 2013, p. 87).  
In short, the already rather poor transatlantic relations deteriorated during the 
Bush presidency, and went from bad to worse, only to stabilise somewhat toward 
the later years of the Bush era (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 41; Nielsen, 2013). 
 
2009-2014: US multilateralism and ‘leading from behind’, the Obama years 
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The US position following the inauguration of the Obama administration was to 
encourage the Europeans to take a more prominent role when dealing with crises in 
the EU’s own backyard (Menon, 2011, p. 75). Obama also made a pledge to 
improve the transatlantic relations that had been damaged during the previous 
presidency. Obama was held in high esteem in the European capitals, and was 
famously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009. The transatlantic relations had in 
short been boosted by the change of president and foreign policy approach (Nielsen, 
2013, p. 83). The change of president in foreign policy approach has been 
interpreted as the Americans trying to ‘lead from behind’ (Howorth, 2014, p. 406). 
This is a distinctly different picture than the one depicted of the GWB-years above, 
which was more of a ‘we lead, they follow’-approach. The approach by the Obama 
administration suited the EU-US relations members significantly better with less 
straining as a result (Nielsen, 2013).  
With the change in presidency from Bush to Obama the importance of ‘soft 
power’ (e.g. international law) was reintroduced as an important tool used to justify 
the use of ‘hard power’ (e.g. military operations). Diplomacy gained in relative 
importance for the US administration, with the State Department gaining in relative 
power vis-à-vis the Defence Department (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 43). Such 
major institutional changes in the US impacted the Europeans by increasingly 
including them in talks. Increasing the diplomatic efforts the US also decreased the 
risk of public confrontation with European allies. This removed strain from the 
transatlantic relationship.  
Although the institutional change and foreign policy stance alleviated stress in 
the EU-US relations, major international scandals re-stressed the relations. Most 
notably the information that the US allegedly has spied on several European heads-
of-state has again damaged the transatlantic relations.33  
All-in-all, the transatlantic relations seem to have improved during the Obama 
presidency if one looks at the surface. Less public confrontation and clashes over 
foreign policy matters. However, Nielsen notes that “the relationship’s underlying 
health is not good and possibly worsening, as ‘drift’ continues and US attention 
shifts to other parts of the world.” (2013, p. 84).  In sum, the state of the relationship 
is difficult to gauge and looking at what is portrayed out in public may not entail 
the true health of the relationship.  
 
A brief summary of a relationship adrift  
 
The transatlantic relations between 1991 and 2014 have been in constant flux. It is 
a special relationship that has been plagued by mistrust, scandals and difficulties to 
adjust to new political realities. Different strategies have been employed by 
different presidents, and up until 2001 the US approach can be summed up as 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
33 http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/02/wikileaks-us-spied-on-angela-merkels-ministers-too-says-
german-newspaper, accessed 7/6-2015; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/francois-hollande-says-
us-spying-on-french-officials-unacceptable-nsa, accessed 7/6-2015    
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selectively multilateral. Over this time, however, the US’ ability to project power 
abroad grew, worrying the Europeans who became wary of this new political reality 
and what it may come to entail. With the election of GWB the selectively 
multilateral approach changed in 2001, and the years of 2001-2006 were signified 
by “unequivocal unilateralism” (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 41; Nielsen, 2013). 
The Obama administration set the goal to mend the relations, but whether or not 
this has succeeded on any significant level is contested (Nielsen, 2013).  
In sum, the ‘transatlantic drift’, or the tension in the relationship between the 
US and the EU, did not start with the Bush administration. Rather, it started during 
the Clinton presidency and during the subsequent presidencies has not been settled, 
although it seems to have improved, especially since the change of presidency from 
Bush to Obama. The change of presidency signified a transition to a more 
multilateral approach in dealing with foreign policy issues, but the health of the 
relationship is difficult to gauge and a continued transatlantic drift may be ongoing 
(Nielsen, 2013).  
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4.4 Timeline 
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5 Analysis and conclusions 
The EU now generates commentary not over whether it is engaged in the use of force but rather over 
what are the most appropriate forms of military coercive capacity the EU should develop. EU-rope 
is now a putative military power. (Whitman in Smith (ed.), 2013, p. 44) 
 
The quote from Whitman above, published in 2013, serves well to introduce this 
analysis. The CSDP has by other analysts been called redundant, ineffective, 
effectively dead, etcetera. The fact remains, however, that the CSDP is indeed alive 
and kicking and every subsequent mission it completes further knits the cooperation 
more tightly together.   
In this section of the paper the analysis of the previous chapters—the 
chronology of the development of the European defence and security cooperation 
and the transatlantic relations—is presented. The analysis has been avoided in the 
previous chapters to allow the reader to assess the analysis more independently.   
The severity of transatlantic disunity is considered in relation to other periods 
of disunity. This allows the possibility to point to moments in time where we would 
expect more or less political will to cooperate among EU member states on a 
common defence. When there is transatlantic disunity related to international 
security management we should, according to the theory, expect increased political 
will among EU members to cooperate on matters of security and defence. This 
political will is, of course, not observable per se. What is observed is instead the 
outcomes of this political will—i.e., policy decisions regarding European security 
cooperation. Political will does not translate directly to decisions, though. The 
decision making process in the CSDP is governed through consensus, meaning 
considerable political will is required to reach any decision on change. This means 
that what the theory predicts will happen (increased political will to cooperate 
(Strömvik, 2005, p. 146)) may happen without it being observable as too little 
political will may not lead to a decision; we do not get an observable outcome. This 
will be taken into account in the analysis.  
The analysis will run into other problems. One is the temporal dimension. After 
how long of the eruption of transatlantic disunity should we expect an EU reaction 
leading to an increased security cooperation? This problem requires caution when 
thinking of making any causal claims. It will be tackled with careful and explicit 
reasoning. 
In this section, the chapters are tied together to answer the research question 
that has guided this paper:  
 
Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they 
do not perceive a shared military threat?  
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In order to answer the research question some recollections of assumptions 
previously stated are necessary.  
Firstly, states are assumed to be influence maximisers and thus only cooperate 
should they gain influence by doing so.  
Secondly, in before cooperating states consider a trade-off where increased 
cooperation yields less autonomy for the state as an actor.  
Thirdly, cooperation is considered a strategy for balancing undertaken in 
relation to the strongest actor in the international system, the US in this time period.  
Fourthly, the political will to cooperate on matters of security and defence 
increases when the most influential actor in the system, the US, pursues a foreign 
policy action which the EU member states disagree with.  
From the account given in this paper it is obvious that the institutionalized 
security cooperation has grown over time, that there has been an observable change 
to the dependent variable. Over time, the trend has been a more autonomous EU, 
perhaps especially so in the field of international security (see e.g. Calleo, 2008; 
Nielsen, 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Haastrup in Laursen (ed.), 2009, pp. 281 
ff). To be more specific, each new iteration of the institutionalized security 
cooperation—WEU-ESDP-CSDP—has been another step in the direction of a more 
tightly integrated and capable security and defence cooperation belonging solely to 
the EU. This development has been underpinned by the various treaties amending 
the Treaty on the European Union (ToA, ToN, ToL). At the same time, the EU 
strategies have given the CSDP direction for future operations, with emphasis on 
the EU acting globally since the 2003 European Security Strategy.  The strategies 
for different parts of Africa previously brought up are clear indicators of this 
continued direction. The EU is thus intent on acting globally as one with CSDP as 
a tool in the EU toolbox.  
While the cooperation has grown in scope, the road has not been without 
obstacles. The obstacles to utilizing the CSDP are necessary to bring up as only 
when they are acknowledged is it possible to appreciate the difficulty facing the 
cooperation. When considering the CSDP it is crucial to keep in mind that it is a 
highly political cooperation concerning the sensitive issues of military and defence. 
In fact, according to Huff it has been a common perception in Brussels that the 
CSDP is seen as a political instrument and that this hampers the ability to employ 
the CSDP to tackle sensitive regions, such as the Eastern Neighbourhood (Huff, 
2011, p. 5). This may be a part in explaining the inability of the EU to utilize the 
CSDP in previous conflicts, such as in Libya.  
Another important point when discussing the CSDP’s ability to act is brought 
up by Menon, who claims that the key to understanding the inability of the EU to 
act within the CSDP framework is to acknowledge that the member states own the 
EU military policies. It is, according to Menon, to err to look at the failure on a 
narrow institutional level. Focusing on the institutional framework and its 
development risks hiding that very fact: member states own their own military 
policies (Menon, 2011, p. 76 f.). Therefore, success or failure of agreed upon 
policies depend on the political will demonstrated by the member states. Focusing 
on the institutions instead “encourages member states to blame the European-level 
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institutional structures for their own failings” (Menon, 2011, p. 77). This point is 
adjacent to one brought up by several other analysts; the re-occurring intra-
European divisions on a number of issues (Nielsen, 2013, p. 97; Gordon & Shapiro, 
2005; Jones, 2007). With differing national preferences comes difficulties to reach 
a consensus, and the political nature of the CSDP comes to the fore, bringing back 
the point made by Huff; it becomes difficult to react and utilize the CSDP in 
politically sensitive regions or conflicts. These points are, however, rather difficult 
to observe as the failure to reach a consensus means there is no action taken. Huff 
believes this has been the case, with several potential military operations being 
dismissed based on either the sensitive nature of the operation or that the will of the 
EU members is diverging.  
All of these obstacles to utilizing the CSDP brought up above are necessary to 
recognise prior to explaining why the cooperation has developed despite them. By 
pointing out the difficulties the cooperation has encountered, and the basis for those 
difficulties, it becomes more of a puzzle that the cooperation was formed, and does 
in fact function and still continues to grow. The importance of the political will of 
the member states in overcoming the obstacles above to form the common security 
and defence project function can probably not be overstated. This brings the 
transatlantic relations to the fore as the potential catalyst for the security 
cooperation.  
The time period analysed in this paper has shown what seems to be an 
interdependence between the EU security and defence cooperation and 
transatlantic relations. When the EU has pushed for an EU unique cooperation, the 
US has at times welcomed an EU taking greater responsibility for the security in 
Europe, and at times shrieked at the potential of an unfettered EU with capabilities 
and political will to act alone (consider the outdrawn talks to reach the Berlin Plus 
arrangements allowing NATO right of first pick, or the letter drawn up by the State 
Department sent to capitals in the early 1990s to try and stem talks of a European 
security organisation). It seems poor transatlantic relations fuels the cooperation, 
which may feed back into even worse transatlantic relations. Mentioning this, it 
would seem this means perpetually worsening relations. However, it must not be 
forgotten that nothing occurs in a vacuum—though it would make studying this 
relationship much easier. At the same time as the EU-US relations are ever 
changing, so are other international relations, as well as domestic political factors. 
These are not accounted for in this paper, making the ordeal of establishing any 
relationship between transatlanticism and the CSDP even more challenging.  
What may be said with certainty is that transatlantic disagreements have been 
recurring over the entire time period analysed in this paper. The point of time from 
which this study started was 1991. The transatlantic relations will now be 
relativized against different points in time, with developments of the CSDP 
considered at the same time. Taking 1991 as the baseline, the transatlantic relations 
started out in a poor state. Recollecting the periods of transatlantic disunity they 
will henceforth be denoted by the US Presidents in office, matching the timeline. 
The first couple of years of this study were the last years of G. H. W. Bush’s 
presidency. The transatlantic relations had been severely shook by the Iran-Contras 
scandal in the late 1980s, and the Helms-Burton and D’amato acts were to follow—
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further placing the EU and US at odds with each other (Smis & Borght, 1999). The 
talks of creating a European defence organisation were already in swing following 
the end of the Cold War. Whether the discussions on creating an EU unique security 
organisation was due to the uncertainties that followed the end of the Cold War, or 
as a balancing strategy versus the US sparked by the poor relations, is difficult to 
say. It does seem to have at least been a hedging of European bets, a way to make 
sure that if the US were to leave the Europeans to fend for themselves in the future, 
there would be some sort of insurance. It should be noted, however, that with the 
Cold War in fresh memory, it was plain to see that the Europeans and the Americans 
did share common values and did stand on the same side, and this notion should not 
be underestimated (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 14; see e.g. Toje, 2010 for a 
discussion on the hedging behaviour). In sum, the years were marked by a clear 
unilateral US approach, challenging the EU member states, e.g. by imposing global 
trade regulations. The Europeans continued talks on joining the WEU and the EU, 
and the Maastricht Treaty is signed in 1992, adding the third pillar of a common 
foreign policy to the EU cooperation and referencing a common defence policy. 
With the election of Clinton the transatlantic relations were immediately 
improved. The US were in an incredibly strong position following the Cold War 
and the EU member states were wary of the US dominance of international affairs. 
Clinton did however appeal to Europeans on a personal level and combined with 
Clinton’s more multilateral approach to international affairs the relations improved 
(Dumbrell, 2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). Over time, however, the US wanted to 
push through foreign policy actions on their terms (e.g. in Kosovo), but clashed 
with the Europeans, thus making it difficult to maintain the multilateral approach. 
Clinton became more unilateral as time passed and his patience with the Europeans 
ran out. Clinton’s appeal with the Europeans faded as well and the relations 
worsened (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Dumbrell, 2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997, and was a compromise between 
members who did not want a security cooperation and those who did. It was a part 
in making the EU militarily operational, and so was another crucial step towards 
greater cooperation in the field of security and defence (Schleich, 2014). The 
Europeans then took a major leap forward in the summit of Saint Malo in 1998 
where France and the previously reluctant UK famously agreed that the EU should 
be able to take autonomous action, kick-starting what would become the ESDP 
(Berenskoetter, 2013). Schleich analysis is straightforward: “[t]he alliance of Great 
Britain and France in St. Malo lifted the process to a higher level, creating an actor 
‘EU’ in security and defence policy during the second phase. It also partially de-
blocked the transatlantic rift, quasi forcing the USA to accept ESDP and tying EU 
and NATO closer to each other.” (Schleich, 2014, p. 199). The case of Saint Malo 
and the signing of the ToA could well be a case of EU member states cooperating 
to balance US influence. With a US able to push the US approach in Kosovo, the 
EU members were probably wary of what the future could hold if US dominance 
continued unhindered. This case would need to be more heavily researched in this 
paper, however, in order to say that it was the case. The Clinton years were years 
of US dominance of international security, and with transatlantic relations that 
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improved, only to worsen yet again. The EU took major steps towards realizing an 
EU cooperation on security and defence.  
Following Clinton’s presidency G. W. Bush was elected. Bush did not appeal 
to the Europeans and the transatlantic relations did not improve as a result. With the 
outspoken unilateral approach the relations actually worsened right off the bat with 
Bush as the new president (Nielsen, 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Dumbrell, 
2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). Bush did not have the favourable geopolitical 
starting conditions Clinton did, however. In fact, Clinton had left some ‘bad poison 
pills’ behind for Bush to deal with (Nielsen, 2013, p. 86). These ‘poison pills’ were 
unresolved issues left by Clinton for Bush to pick up, such as the failure to get the 
Kyoto protocol through the senate, another was withdrawing Clinton’s signature 
from the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court. Both the ICC and Kyoto 
protocol were important political issues for the EU, and so failing to meet expected 
obligations impacted the relations negatively (Nielsen, 2013). In 2001 the Treaty of 
Nice was signed, which formally created the European Defence Agency. This 
agency’s purpose was to improve the conditions for a strengthened European 
security and defence cooperation, such as improving European defence industries. 
This helped make the EU more autonomous in the field of security and so was 
another step towards the EU as an autonomous actor in the field of international 
security (Wivel, 2005; Whitman, 2004).  
Still on his first year as president the 9/11 attacks happened. This rallied the 
Europeans to the Americans’ side as NATO’s article V was invoked, the Europeans 
were, however, more or less shrugged off by the US. In the wake of the attacks the 
US unilateral approach became even more noticeable and Bush pushed even harder 
for a regime overthrow in Iraq. The US also presented their National Security 
Strategy of 2002 which focused on ‘pre-emptive’ war, which meant preventive war 
(Nielsen, 2013, p. 87; also see the NSS 2002). In response to the NSS the Europeans 
presented an EU equivalent, the European Security Strategy, or the ESS. This 
emphasized the more global direction and role the EU intended to have in the years 
to come (Toje, 2010).  
The US invasion of Iraq was at first blocked by the Europeans in the Security 
Council, meaning UN support for the invasion was off the table. These clashes over 
Iraq sparked lots of tension between the EU and the US, but also showed the 
disunity of the EU member states where some supported the US and some fiercely 
opposed. The final decision by the US to invade Iraq and failing to find the WMDs 
further aggravated the situation between the EU and the US, making 2003 the year 
the relations were at their worst so far of this time period  (see e.g. Nielsen 2013; 
Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Ratti, 2014, pp. 371 ff.). Following the outdrawn 
conflict in Iraq, the Bush administration tentatively became more multilateral in its 
foreign policy approach in 2006 and the transatlantic relations improved. During 
the Bush era, the EU members launched five military operations, and signed the 
Treaty of Lisbon which gave significant room for the new CSDP, which further 
strengthened the cooperation (Menon, 2011).  
In 2009 president Obama took office. Obama’s appeal to the Europeans was 
unmistakable, and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Nielsen, 2013). Obama’s 
administration had a greater focus on multilateralism from the start, and the 
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transatlantic relations improved significantly. Obama also promoted an EU security 
approach, wanting the Europeans to take greater responsibility for European 
security (Menon, 2011; Howorth, 2013). Several European security strategies are 
presented, notably for several regions in Africa. This shows EU’s continued intent 
to be a global actor with international impact. One new military operation is 
launched.  
The Obama years were signified by improved transatlantic relations. The later 
years these relations deteriorated, however, when the espionage scandals surfaced.  
 The transatlantic relations have thus not been poor for the entire time, they have 
varied. But the underlying health of the relationship seems to have been shaky at 
best with constant stress being applied to it. However, with values and history 
shared over the Atlantic the relationship remains strong and oftentimes amicable, 
though still unhealthy. Foundational trust between the EU and the US seems to be 
lacking, making future progress on the CSDP project likely, and thus further 
distancing the EU from US dominance through greater autonomy.  
5.1.1 The future of the transatlantic relationship 
 
EU’s relatively recent indecisive actions taken in regards to Libya within the CSDP 
framework (described above) were considered alarming to the US for several 
reasons. Firstly, the US was looking for the EU to shoulder a greater responsibility 
for security issues in the EU’s neighbourhood. Secondly, it was considered 
alarming for the sake of the security cooperation’s wellbeing (Menon, 2011, p. 76).  
The inability to do decisively act strengthened the view some US officials held of 
an EU wanting more autonomy but reluctant to pay the price for it. It was later 
acknowledged that “in spite of 12 years of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), the European countries could not have succeeded without the US’ 
technical support and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)” (Nielsen, 2013, p. 98). 
The US Secretary of Defence of the time, Robert Gates, gave words to US 
frustration over the European allies’ inability to act and overall contribution to the 
crisis in Libya. Gates said that ‘[f]uture U.S. political leaders, those for whom the 
Cold War was not the formative experience it was for me, may not consider the 
return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost’ (as quoted in Nielsen, 
2013, p. 98). 
Considering the complex relationship between France and NATO may be 
crucial to understand why certain issues, e.g. the currently highly relevant EU 
Africa policy, are shaped in the manner they are (see e.g. Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 
2014). France was a founding member of NATO and has since the early Cold War 
been a key contributor. France has viewed European defence and NATO as 
different projects, which is a different view than that of many other European 
partners (Ratti, 2014, p. 374). France re-entered NATO’s military structures in 
2009. This decision to become a full partner again is politically and psychologically 
important not only for France but for its allies (Ratti, 2014, p. 375).  
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“Thus, when the French Government decided to include its Africa’s policy in 
the EU framework, it inevitably did so via the intergovernmental procedure of the 
CFSP. This might explain the EU’s decision to increase its ESDP operations to 
support its crisis management initiatives in Africa, thus adding political and military 
components to the otherwise economic/civilian core of the strategy of structural 
stability.” (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 57) 
The Africa policy is important to mention in this analysis for several reasons. 
Firstly, instability and ungoverned spaces in especially the northern parts of Africa 
pose potential security threats to the EU members. The EU intervention in Libya 
was an attempt to deal with this. The US have their own reasons, such as combating 
terrorism, to be present in the same regions. As long as the EU and the US have the 
same goals and similar strategies, it will likely be a successful co-venture. If the 
goals or strategies start to diverge, however, it is likely that further steps are taken 
to improve the CSDP.  
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6 Conclusions 
Nobody is happy with the current situation. A feeling of European free-riding is getting more 
firmly entrenched on Capitol Hill. Europe is uncomfortable in the role of junior partner; it is 
not willing to follow any US lead, but cannot very credibly criticise US militarism while 
simultaneously banking on the security provided by said militarism. (Nielsen, 2013, p. 99) 
 
A recurring point noticeable in the analysis. The states as actors own the CSDP 
actions and their own foreign policies. This is a case in point for the assumption by 
Strömvik that states are influence maximisers, and thus act to increase their 
influence when cooperating on matters of security and defence. Consider the Sahel 
region, which is important for France for various reasons. This region is also 
important for due to the security risk they pose as ungoverned space.  
Consider the political fallout between the EU and the US. The institutional 
changes and the official documents on strategy presented by the EU signals that the 
EU is striving to become more autonomous and more global on issues of 
international security. Help from the US is still sought as a foundational security 
vent for the EU. But, in international affairs the EU is signalling its intent to become 
a more active and autonomous actor. A reminder of the ever changing political 
relationships and the never changing nature of politics; the importance of relative 
power and influence.  
6.1 Conclusions on the CSDP 
The EU military operations conducted within the WEU/ESDP/CSDP frameworks 
show the implications of the EU goal to be a more global actor (e.g. the European 
Security Strategy, ESS). The missions have grown considerably in size and the 
‘theatre of operations’ has expanded from inside Europe to central countries and 
regions in Africa. The EU is indeed a global actor, although it still has endemic 
issues in need of resolve, and its efficiency as a security provider may be discussed. 
This issue boils down to that unanimous agreement is necessary for any CSDP 
operations, but there are several other issues plaguing the CSDP (Menon, 2011).  
There have been issues with a gap in expectations and capabilities, i.e. that 
equipment has been lacking. The want in EU capabilities is not necessarily due to 
a lack of investments by the Europeans, however. In 2006 the EU member states 
together spent almost a quarter of the global defence spending. The EU members’ 
spending was the equivalent of 60% of the US defence budget. The EU thus spends 
considerable amounts on defence, but still finds themselves lacking in capabilities. 
The main issue is, however, that circa 70% of the land forces of EU member states 
are not able to operate outside of national territory. The forces instead need to be 
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able to handle increasingly expeditionary and multinational settings if the CSDP is 
to be able to handle the set goals (Menon, 2011, p. 80). This is necessary to have in 
mind as major obstacles still stand in way of an efficient CSDP.  
The principle ‘costs lie where they fall’ is the principle guiding actions taken 
within the CSDP framework. This principle means that those states actually 
participating in an operation are the ones who will have to pay the costs (Menon, 
2011, p. 83 ff.). It is worth mentioning that the UK and France together account for 
more than 40% of EU defence spending (Menon, 2011, p. 84). In order to become 
more efficient the cooperation has many obstacles still to overcome. Issues of 
funding, political will and intentions are all important.  
Even when deployed, the forces run into trouble. On such problem is that the 
forces lack the means to work together seamlessly. Often times the different forces 
use different systems for communications, different types of combat vehicles (when 
they use the same vehicles they are often of different configuration which means 
spare parts aren’t interchangeable), etcetera (Menon, 2011, p. 81). The Treaty of 
Lisbon tries to tackle the capabilities deficit and the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) has since 2004 actively attempted to improve European defence capabilities 
by promoting armaments cooperation and creating a European arms market. 
Improving capabilities is not the only purpose, however. EDA is also a part of an 
EU strategy to become more self-sufficient, and thus less dependent on US arms 
(Menon, 2011, p. 81; Jones, 2007, pp. 159 ff.).   
In short, the EU forces are relatively uncoordinated and far from streamlined, 
causing issues that need to be resolved for the CSDP to become a more stable 
security organisation. It thus seems a political solution is the necessary remedy, and 
not merely increased investments or similar quick fixes. Taking the political steps 
necessary towards improving the CSDP may be less visible, but still important in 
balancing US influence and improving EU autonomy. With greater EU military 
capabilities the EU becomes a stronger actor and ally which lessens the burden of 
securing Europe for the US. The US has asked for the EU to take a greater regional 
responsibility for security. However, in increasing its capabilities the EU also 
becomes a more autonomous international actor, able to act in its own interest—
which may be at odds with the interests of the US. “CSDP was not designed with 
the purpose of pleasing the United States and it would be misleading to conclude 
that there is fruitful coordination, let alone cooperation, between the European 
Union and NATO. There is not, Berlin-Plus agreements and battlegroups 
notwithstanding.” (Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 384) 
6.2 The next step 
The analysis has shown the importance of continued studies of the CSDP and its 
connection to transatlantic relations in general, but perhaps also shown the 
importance of analysing the role of the major powers in Europe in the transatlantic 
relations and the development of the CSDP. It is essential to remember that actions 
taken within the CSDP construct, veto or approval, are not isolated from other 
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arenas, such as bilateral relations. Thus, these need to be taken into consideration 
at the same time.  The next step for this study would be to test it against competing 
theories.  
Howorth claims a possible solution to the relationship between the EU and the 
US is a merger between, or an integration of, NATO and the CSDP. A key element 
of this solution is that the EU takes on a larger responsibility for security issues in 
general, and specifically takes on the majority of the heavy duty security work in 
EU’s backyard (2014, p. 413). Different analysts come to different conclusions. 
What seems to be a unifying conclusion of CSDP analysts, however, is that the EU 
needs to be taking a larger share of the security issues in and around Europe. 
Nielsen’s words of wisdom will end this study: 
 
The literature is almost unanimous in its recommendations for this bargain: Europe 
taking defence seriously again, ending its free-riding on the USA and becoming a real 
partner; the USA embracing other means of policy than the military ones, becoming 
a bit more appreciative of others’ efforts, and just a little less ‘exceptional’ in its way 
with international institutions. Solutions so deceptively simple have, however, eluded 
policy-makers for the past 20 years or more. (Nielsen, 2013, p. 103). 
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